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THEORY OF MIND DIFFERENCES IN ASD CHILDREN
Abstract
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by impairments in social
interaction and social communication (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
At the core of the social impairment is a likely deficit in the Theory of Mind (ToM). This
study uses ToM measures to assess emotion recognition and desire-based emotions preand post-intervention in neurotypical and ASD children between the ages of 8 and 12
following nine weeks of social-cognitive intervention (i.e., individualized Social Stories).
Results showed that neurotypical children have greater emotion recognition and
understanding of desire-based emotion than children with ASD, and that children with
ASD exhibit variable improvements in their ToM following social story (SS)
intervention.
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THEORY OF MIND DIFFERENCES IN ASD CHILDREN
Theory of Mind Differences Between Children with and without Autism Spectrum
Disorder Following Social Story Intervention
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is generally characterized by impairments in
social interaction and social communication. These impairments are paired with
stereotyped and repetitive patterns of behavior and restrictive repetitive interests (DSM-5,
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although the core cause alludes us, it has been
found that a deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM) including a lack of emotion recognition is
core to the social impairment characteristic of ASD (Kim et al., 2015).
Theory of Mind involves an individual’s ability to think and understand what
others may think about events or situations in a manner that is different from their own
perspective; it also includes skills such as understanding pretense and false belief
(Doherty, 2009; Hutchins & Prelock, 2008; 2016). Theory of Mind requires an individual
to pay attention to, and understand the attitudes, intentions, emotions, and beliefs of self
and others (Doherty, 2009).
The purpose of this study is to use behavioral measures of Theory of Mind (ToM)
to reveal developmental differences between children with and without ASD as well as
growth in ToM following a social story (SS) intervention. In order to understand what is
currently known about the developmental differences between the two groups and the
gaps in knowledge requiring further investigation, the review of literature focuses on
three primary areas: the characteristics of the social impairment in ASD, ToM
development in children with and without ASD, and SS as an intervention to support
ToM and more broadly, social cognition.
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Review of Literature
Characteristics of ASD
ASD is a common disorder in the US with approximately 1 in 54 children (Center
for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2020) affected and various levels of severity.
The main deficits include social communication and social interaction, and restricted
repetitive patterns of behavior (APA, 2013). Nonverbal behaviors that regulate
communication are important to successful social interaction yet these behaviors (e.g.,
eye contact, body postures, gestures) are compromised in children with ASD. Failure to
develop peer relationships is another key deficit although there may be greater interest in
forming relationships as children increase in age. Generally, children with ASD do not
seek shared interests and frequently avoid social situations. When individuals with ASD
socialize, conversation is generally one-sided and does not involve shared interests (APA,
2013). Underlying this social impairment is a core deficit in ToM (Hutchins & Prelock,
2008).
Theory of Mind in Neurotypical Children
The development of Theory of Mind in neurotypical individuals is different from
that in ASD individuals. Neurotypical children develop the ability to predict, explain, and
manipulate the beliefs of others around the age of four along with being able to
understand desires and appearance-reality contrasts (Doherty, 2009). The change in
understanding that occurs at this age likely comes from the child having a better
understanding of the world around them particularly through language and the
development of false belief understanding. Although these skills begin to develop around
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this age, the skills are not fully developed and evolve over time (Doherty, 2009).
Children under the age of four don’t fully understand many of the concepts involved in
Theory of Mind, however, some early skill development in pretend play (e.g., joint
attention, experience sharing, symbolic understanding) and emotion recognition
facilitates a child’s development of Theory of Mind skills.
Joint attention requires focusing attention mutually with another person (Whalen,
Schreibman & Ingersoll, 2006), which makes it a steppingstone to more complex social
interaction. Joint attention typically presents itself around nine or ten months (McArthur
& Adamson, 1996), and develops until eighteen months (Jones & Carr, 2004). This
behavior involves sharing and monitoring attention on both objects and social partners.
The use of gestures and eye movements to share an action, object or experience
characterizes a child’s ability to respond to and initiate joint attention communicative acts
(McArthur & Adamson, 1996). Children begin responding to others by looking at an
object that is being referenced, and by pointing to and focusing their eyes on the object or
activity to direct the attention of their communicative partner (Mundy & Jarrold, 2010).
Emotion recognition is “the ability to recognize and interpret the emotions of
other[s]” (Fitzpatrick et al., 2018, p. 3). The relationship between emotion recognition
and ToM is that knowing the emotional state of a person being observed as well as their
position in space should result in a prediction of what they are thinking (Brothers, 1990).
This theory is supported by studies that found there was a positive correlation between
the number of emotions and the number of intentions recognized accurately. This data
was further supported using fMRI data which showed that the two conditions
(recognition of emotions and intentions) presented with overlapping brain activity (Bora
3
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et al., 2005; Brüne, 2005a; Buitelaar & van der Wees, 1997; Dyck et al., 2006; Henry et
al., 2006; Mier et al., 2010). In neurotypical individuals, static displays of happiness,
sadness, and surprise can be observed starting from three to four months of age, while
dynamic displays of happiness and anger start around seven months old (Young-Browne
et al., 1977; Soken & Pick, 1992). By four years old, children can recognize and make
displays of happiness, sadness, and anger as well as show increased ability in the
recognition of fear and surprise (Widen & Russell, 2003). While recognition of these
emotions generally reaches adult levels by the age of 10, recognition of more subtle
emotions (lesser intensities within the existing emotion categories) is still developing and
continues to do so throughout adolescence, eventually reaching the maximum capability
at adulthood when subtle emotions are able to be quickly and accurately identified
(Bruce, et al., 2000; Calder et al., 1996; De Sonneville, et al., 2002; Durand et al., 2007;
Ekman, 2003; Herba et al., 2006; Mondloch et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2007).
Emotion recognition is very important in the interpretation of a social situation
(Adolphs, 2002) but it is not completely dependent on facial expressions; body language
is also a consideration. Body language can affect how a facial expression can be
interpreted (Meeren et al., 2005). This was demonstrated in a study which took
prototypical pictures of disgust faces on bodies expressing different emotions and found
that putting a face in a specific context caused a drastic change in the recognition and
identification of emotional categories, particularly when the body language was the
complete opposite of the facial expression as the basic facial expression was lost
(Aviezer, Hassin, Ryan et al., 2008; Aviezer, Hassin, Bentin et al., 2008). Notably,
emotion recognition is heavily influenced by knowledge of the social situation, body
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postures, voices, scenes, linguistic labels, or other emotional faces (Aviezer, Hassin,
Ryan et al., 2008; Barrett et al., 2007; Carroll and Russell 1996; de Gelder and Vroomen,
2000; Meeren et al., 2005; Righart and de Gelder, 2006, 2008a, b; Russel and Fehr, 1987;
Van den Stock et al., 2007).
Theory of Mind in ASD
Research suggests that children with ASD have a core deficit in ToM that affects
their social cognition and ability to communicate (Durkin & Ziatas, 1998; Hutchins &
Prelock, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2009). Children with ASD usually fail false-belief tests
and are unable to make second order mental state attributions, meaning they do not
understand that people may think in different ways. Children with ASD may be able to
distinguish between what they see and what others see, but they seldom recognize their
thinking and the thinking of others (Tager-Flusberg, 1992).
Social communication behavior, such as joint attention is an early developing
ToM skill and is often a key predictor in the early identification of children with ASD. In
contrast to typically developing children, children with ASD show deficits in joint
attention. For example, Shumway and Wetherby (2009) observed joint attention through
videotaped behavior samples and found that children with ASD performed joint attention
acts less often than typically developing or developmentally delayed children (Shumway
& Wetherby, 2009). Covert attention in children with ASD, on the other hand, is
exceptional (Chawarska et al., 2003; Iarocci & Burack, 2004). Covert attention is the
ability to change the focus of attention to different locations without overt eye or head
movements. This is extremely important in the selection of relevant objects and events
(Benedict et al., 2002). Studies have shown that individuals with autism are able to
5
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outperform their neurotypical peers in measures of covert attention (Casey et al., 1993;
Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005). When using covert attention, individuals with autism
attend to the direction that the eyes of the person they are observing are gazing instead of
the turning of one’s head or the point of a finger as is done in joint attention, presenting
itself as early as 2 years old (Chawarska et al., 2003; Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2004; Senju
et al., 2004; Swettenham et al., 2003; Vlamings et al., 2005). Additionally, individuals
with autism outperform neurotypical individuals because they will only change their
focus when the gaze of the person they are observing is informative and predictive: they
are “not ‘fooled’ by a nonpredictive gaze cue” (Ristic et al., 2005, p. 717).
Thus, the difference between joint attention and covert attention in autistic
individuals likely lies in the ability of ASD individuals to resist distraction (Gernsbacher
et al., 2008). Studies quantifying the resistance of autistic children to distraction found
that they remained focused for more than two times as long as neurotypical children
matched for mental age (Landry & Bryson, 2004; Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005). On
Meltzhoff intentionality tasks, it was found that young preverbal autistic children perform
significantly better than normally developing infants, autistic preschoolers are no worse
than their matched peers, grade school autistic children have “intact abilities in
monitoring basic actions, intact abilities in reporting an intention, both for self and for
another agent, and intact ability in reporting intended actions,” and autistic adults show
“the same pattern of results as the matched control group” (Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, &
Bower, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001; Russell & Hill, 2001, p. 317; Sebanz et al., 2005, p.
433).
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ToM involves multiple skills from understanding pretense and false belief to
recognizing complex emotions such as embarrassment and guilt or the difference
between joking and bullying (Hutchins & Prelock, 2008; 2016a,b). A good deal of
research has shown that emotion recognition is impaired in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985; Bölte and Poustka, 2003; Hobson, 1986; Kuuskikko et al., 2009) while others have
found that it is not (Prior et al., 1990; Capps et al., 1992; Castelli, 2005; Robel et al.,
2004). Reviews have suggested that the impairment in facial emotion recognition in ASD
is attributed to three factors: demographic characteristics, task demands, and the
behaviors being measured. The conclusion in these reviews was that those with ASD
follow a different path to emotion recognition than neurotypical individuals as the ASD
individuals are able to successfully complete some emotion recognition tasks (Harms et
al., 2010; Black et al., 2017; Fitzpatrick et al., 2018).
By ten years of age, autistic children show a lesser ability at labeling prototypic
expressions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise) when compared with
neurotypical individuals (Lindner & Rosen, 2006; Tantam et al., 1989). However, by the
age of twelve, the emotion recognition of those individuals with ASD and higher
cognitive and linguistic skills is no different than that of neurotypical individuals (Capps
et al., 1992; Grossman et al., 2000). While the observed impairment seems to be
negligible by the age of twelve, if the stimulus is shown only briefly or is subtle,
individuals with autism do have difficulty recognizing them (Critchley et al., 2000;
Mazefsky & Oswald, 2007; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Humphreys et al., 2007). This suggests
that while emotion recognition in individuals with autism improves with age, they never
reach the proficiency of neurotypical individuals (Rump et al., 2009).
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The emotions selected for this study are surprise, embarrassment, and desirebased emotions. Surprise requires understanding that the achieved outcome is different
from the expected (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Heerey et al., 2003). Few studies have been
conducted examining embarrassment in autistic children. Embarrassment requires selfawareness and perceiving deviations from the social norm (Heerey et al., 2003;
Edelmann, 1985; Edelmann, 1981; Edelmann & Hampson, 1981). Embarrassment is an
emotion that does not often occur when alone, it generally occurs in the presence of
others with the emotion occurring because an individual is able to perceive that those
around them are thinking about them negatively following a social transgression, which
is an aspect of ToM, understanding what others think (Edelmann, 1981; Miller, 1995).
Desire-based emotion references emotions that stem from desire, that is, fulfilling a
desire results in a positive emotion and not fulfilling a desire leads to negative emotions
(Rieffe et al., 2001; Rieffe et al., 2000).
Understanding the emotions of others is important in the development of
relationships and responding appropriately as it helps an individual understand what a
socially acceptable statement would be and properly understanding when to enter or leave
a social situation which is an indicator of social competence (Izard et al., 2001). Children
with ASD have difficulty recognizing surprise and embarrassment and while desire-based
emotions are easier to recognize, these emotions often require clarification, mainly due to
the impairment in their ability to understand mental states. Additionally, those with highfunctioning autism often find it difficult to talk about self-conscious emotions, recounting
facts instead of personal knowledge, likely because these emotions do not occur
spontaneously in children with autism. In studies requiring individuals with autism to rate
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or report the experiences of emotions including embarrassment, the results suggest they
are able to recognize the experience of embarrassment in others, but not in themselves
(Capps et al., 1992; Heerey et al., 2003; Hillier & Allinson, 2002; Kasari et al., 2001;
Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2012). It is important that interventions are designed to support a
child’s ToM, particularly their understanding of emotions critical to their success in
establishing positive social encounters.
Social Stories
Social stories (SS) are short, personalized narratives that describe a social
behavior, in the context of a child’s daily social experiences, which may have led to an
unsuccessful social exchange. In this study, surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based
emotions were targeted to advance our understanding of how a social cognitive
intervention like SS might facilitate greater recognition and understanding of these
emotions. These personalized SS are written from the point of view of the participant for
whom they are being developed. As such, they make use of images along with short,
descriptive sentences outlining social cues and responses that are socially acceptable
behavior (Gray, 2010). Social stories have been successfully used to teach specific social
and behavioral skills in children with ASD across ability levels. Research reports fewer
inappropriate social behaviors for children with ASD in the home and school setting
following the use of social stories (Adams et al., 2004; Asmaa Abdullah, 2014; Delano &
Snell, 2006; Fatemeh et al., 2015; Hala, 2014; Kuoch & Mirenda, 2003; Kuttler et al.,
1998; Norris & Dattilo, 1999; Scattone et al., 2006; Swaggart, et al., 1995). Social stories
have also been used to support perspective taking in children with ASD (Hutchins &
Prelock, 2013 a,b). Children with ASD have difficulty interpreting social situations and
9
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often behave inappropriately in those situations (Prelock, 2019). Social stories benefit
children with ASD by targeting specific areas of difficulty, particularly the ability to take
the perspective of another. This inability to ‘read’ socially relevant cues in an interaction
can be fostered through a SS that describe everyday occurrences in a way that allows
children with autism to act in a more socially accepted manner.
In this study, behavioral measures of Theory of Mind were used to examine the
developmental differences between children with and without ASD and the changes in
ToM following social story interventions focusing on surprise, embarrassment, and
desire-based emotions. It is expected that neurotypical children will have higher scores
on measures of ToM than children with autism both pre- and post-intervention.
Additionally, it is expected that the children with ASD will show variable improvement
in their ToM following intervention with little to no change in ToM for neurotypical
children.
Methodology
Participants
Originally, there were 10 participants in this study, including five dyads matched
for age and gender (one child with ASD, and one neurotypical child in each dyad). Due to
COVID-19 challenges and retention of participants, one dyad was dropped from the
study, leaving four remaining dyads. The children were between the ages of 8 and 12 and
were native English speakers. The matched pairs were within six months of age. Children
with ASD were previously diagnosed by a medical professional with experience
assessing children with ASD. Diagnosis was also confirmed using the Autism Diagnostic
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Observation Schedule-2 (ADOS-2) (Lord et al., 2013) and the Social Communication
Questionnaire-Lifetime version (SCQ) (Rutter et al., 2003). Children were excluded from
the study if their nonverbal IQ fell below 70 as assessed by the Universal Nonverbal
Intelligence Test-2 (UNIT-2) (Bracken & McCallum, 2016) and if they exhibited a
language impairment greater than 2.5 standard deviations below the expected mean for
age as measured on the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL)
(Carrow-Woolfolk, 2017). One exception was made for a child with ASD whose UNIT-2
score on the abbreviated measure met the 70 or higher inclusion criteria but was below
the CASL language score. The child was included at the request of the parent and
because he was quite verbal but struggled with completing formal measures of language
and could benefit from the intervention. Dr. Patricia Prelock’s IRB protocol was
followed.
Table 1 presents the demographic information of all eight participants, including
their age, gender, and pre-assessment scores on measures of language, intelligence, and
autism for those with a prior ASD diagnosis. Means and standard deviations of scores on
the pre-intervention measures as well as age are included.
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Table 1: ADOS-2, SCQ, CASL, and UNIT-2 scores for all participants
Dyad 1
Participant ID

Dyad 2

Dyad 3

Dyad 4

N7

A5

N8

A1

N15

A6

N11

A3

Age

9
years
2
month
s

8
years
8
month
s

9
years
4
month
s

9
years
2
month
s

12
years
0
month
s

12
years
1
mont
h

12
years
7
month
s

12
years
4
month
s

Gender

F

F

M

M

M

M

M

M

Mean

Standard
Deviatio
n

10
years 8
months

1 year 7
months

ADOS-2 Total

11

12

12

21

14

4.062

SCQ

30

27

14

25

24

6.042

UNIT-2

CASL

115

91

106

97

115

121

110

40

99.375

24.274

Full Scale

110

94

113

121

110

127

106

64

105.62
5

18.214

Abbreviate
d

118

97

124

121

109

118

121

73

110.12
5

16.221

Measures
Measures of language and intellectual development as well as pre-postassessments of ToM were completed for the 8 participants.
Theory of Mind Inventory-2 (ToMI-2). The ToMI-2 is a 60-item measure
completed by parents assessing specific ToM dimension. ToMI-2 is a socially and
ecologically valid index of ToM with good test-retest reliability, internal consistency, and
criterion-related validity for neurotypical and ASD children (Hutchins, & Prelock
2016a,b; Hutchins et al., 2012; Lerner et al., 2011). The ToMI-2 was administered preand post-intervention.
Theory of Mind Task Battery (ToMTB). The ToMTB consists of 15 test
questions within 9 tasks that assess a child’s understanding of ToM. The tasks are
presented as brief descriptions that appear in a story-book format accompanied by color
12
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illustrations. Like the ToMI-2, the ToMTB has a strong test-retest reliability (Hutchins, &
Prelock 2016a,b; Hutchins et al., 2008). The ToMTB was administered pre- and postintervention.
Universal Nonverbal Intelligence Test-2 (UNIT-2). The UNIT-2 is a
multidimensional assessment of intelligence using nonverbal tasks (Bracken &
McCallum 2016, Moore et al., 2017). It has strong internal consistency, test-retest
reliability and content, concurrent and predictive validity (Community-University
Partnership 2011). The UNIT-2 was administered prior to intervention only as a baseline
measure of intelligence.
Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language (CASL). The CASL is a
language assessment consisting of 15 subtests that measure language for individuals 3
through 21. For this study, only 5 of the subtests necessary to establish the language core
were used (Carrow-Woolfolk, 2017). It has strong internal consistency and test-retest
reliability (Denman et al., 2017). The CASL was administered prior to intervention only
as a baseline measure of language.
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-2 (ADOS-2). The ADOS-2 is a semistructured assessment of social communication, social interaction, and play for
individuals suspected of having ASD (Lord et al., 2013). This assessment has high levels
of sensitivity and specificity (Hutchins et al., 2019). The ADOS-2 was administered to all
students with ASD as a clinical measure of autism.
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). The SCQ is a questionnaire
consisting of 40 yes/no questions completed by parents about their child’s
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communication and social functioning (Rutter et al., 2003) with adequate sensitivity and
specificity (Bradley et al., 2016). The SCQ was administered to all students with ASD as
a parent rating of autism.
Intervention
The intervention included three personalized SS, one for each emotion, based on
the individual child’s experiences with surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based
emotions. The stories were developed by research assistants based on personal history
information provided by parents in response to specific situational questions. This
information was used to develop the individualized social stories used in the intervention.
Once the stories were developed, pictures were added through Boardmaker, a story
making program. The stories, including the content, words and pictures used were
reviewed and approved by the family. Each story was read to the child three times a week
for 3 weeks by a research assistant assigned to them for the duration of their intervention
period and the intervention was videotaped. Stories were randomized for each child. The
intervention was designed to highlight for the child why the recognition of these
emotions is important, beginning each story with an explanation of why the story was
being read and how it was developed. Following the intervention, the child received 5-10
minutes of playtime if desired. Following each intervention session, the interventionist
completed a fidelity checklist which detailed the procedure followed during the
intervention session and gave an opportunity for the interventionist to name any
deviations from procedure, questions asked during the intervention, and overall
perception of the child and their receptiveness to the story. The videos of the first three
readings of each SS were also viewed by the principal investigator to verify intervention
14
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fidelity. Appendices A, B, and C provide examples of the SS developed for one of the
neurotypical participants. Appendices D, E, and F provide examples of the SS developed
for one of the autistic participants.
Results
Overall, all the children with ASD performed more poorly on the pre- and postintervention than the neurotypical participants with the exception of A6 whose Theory of
Mind Task Battery (ToMTB) total score pre- and post-intervention and Theory of Mind
Inventory-2 (ToMI-2) Composite Mean, Early Subscale, and Advanced Subscale postintervention scores were greater than those of his matched neurotypical participant (i.e.,
N15). A post-intervention score for ToMTB and ToMI-2 is considered clinically
meaningful if the score is 2 points greater or less than the pre-intervention score
(Hutchins & Prelock, 2016a,b).
Two of the four participants with ASD showed a clinically significant difference
in their ToMTB total score and one of the four showed a clinically significant difference
in the ToMI-2 composite mean post-intervention. One of the four neurotypical
participants showed a clinically significant difference in the ToMTB total score and two
of the four showed a clinically significant difference in the ToMI-2 composite mean postintervention.
Dyad 1: N7 vs. A5
In the pre-intervention assessment, it was found that A5 performed more poorly
than N7 on both the ToMTB and ToMI-2 with scores of 9 and 9.4 (composite mean),
respectively, where N7 had scores of 14 and 18.9. Both participants correctly responded
15
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to ToMTB question 5, assessing desire-based emotion. When breaking down the ToMI-2
score into the early, basic, and advanced subscales, A5 consistently showed a poorer
performance than N7 with scores of 12.5, 10.9, and 6, respectively, compared to N7’s
scores of 19.4, 19.1, and 18.3. When examining item specific ToMI-2 scores for surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotion, A5 showed scores lower than those of N7,
which is consistent with the previously mentioned results.
In the post-intervention assessment, A5 showed a clinically significant decrease in
her ToMTB score with a score of 7, while N7 showed no change. In the ToMI-2,
however, A5 showed a clinically significant increase in her ToMI-2 composite mean,
with a score of 12 (increased from 9.4), while N7 showed no change. When looking at
the early, basic, and advanced subscales, A5 showed a clinically significant change in
both the basic and advanced subscales with scores of 14 and 9.7 (vs. 10.9 and 6). When
considering the item specific scores for surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based
emotion, A5 showed a clinically significant change for desire-based emotion, with a
score of 16.8. N7 showed no change in his scores for ToMI-2, with the exception of his
score on the item for embarrassment which showed a clinically significant increase with a
score of 18.9.
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Table 2: ToM scores for N7 and A5 pre- and post-intervention
N7

A5

Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

ToMTB Total

14

14

9

7

ToMI-2
Composite Mean

18.9

19.5

9.4

12

ToMI-2 Early
Subscale

19.4

19.5

12.5

12.3

ToMI-2 Basic
Subscale

19.1

19.7

10.9

14

ToMI-2
Advanced
Subscale

18.3

19.3

6

9.7

Table 3: Surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion scores for N7 and A5
Pre-Intervention

N7
Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

A5
Post-Intervention

ToMTB TQ 5
(desire-based
emotion)

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

ToMI-2 51
(surprise)

19

20

11

10

ToMI-2 52
(embarrassment)

16.7

18.9

4.8

5.1

ToMI-2 59
(desire-based
emotion)

19.5

18.8

14.8

16.8

Dyad 2: N8 vs. A1
In the pre-intervention assessment, it was found that A1 performed more poorly
than N8 on both the ToMTB and the ToMI-2 with scores of 12 and 11.2, respectively, as
compared to scores of 15 and 18.5 for N8. Both participants correctly responded to
ToMTB question 5, assessing desire-based emotion. On the ToMI-2 scores for the early,
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basic, and advanced subscales, A1 consistently showed a poorer performance than N8
with scores of 11.6, 13, and 9.1, respectively compared to N8’s scores of 18.6, 19.7, and
17.1. For item specific ToMI-2 scores for surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based
emotion, A1 showed scores lower than those of N8, which is consistent with the
previously mentioned results.
In the post-intervention assessment, A1 showed a clinically significant
improvement in his ToMTB performance with a score of 14, while N8 showed no change
due to meeting the highest possible score. In the ToMI-2, however, A1 showed no
clinically significant difference in the composite mean or the early, basic, and advanced
subscales. Interestingly, when looking at the item specific scores for surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotions, surprise and embarrassment showed a
notable decrease for A1. N8 showed no change in his scores for ToMI-2, with the
exception of his score on the item for embarrassment which showed a clinically
significant increase.
Table 4: ToM scores for N8 and A1 pre- and post-intervention
N8

A1

Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

ToMTB Total

15

15

12

14

ToMI-2
Composite Mean

18.5

19.3

11.2

11

ToMI-2 Early
Subscale

18.6

19.5

11.6

13.3

ToMI-2 Basic
Subscale

19.7

19.9

13

12

ToMI-2
Advanced
Subscale

17.1

18.5

9.1

8.5
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Table 5: Surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion scores for N8 and A1
Pre-Intervention

N8
Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

A1
Post-Intervention

ToMTB TQ 5
(desire-based
emotion)

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

ToMI-2 51
(surprise)

18.4

19

12.7

10.2

ToMI-2 52
(embarrassment)

15

19

11

5.4

ToMI-2 59
(desire-based
emotion)

20

20

15.3

16.6

Dyad 3: N15 vs. A6
In the pre-intervention assessment, it was found that A6 performed better on the
ToMTB and worse on the ToMI-2 than N15 with scores of 13 and 17.6, respectively
where N15 produced scores of 12 and 19.3. Both participants correctly responded to
ToMTB question 5, assessing desire-based emotion. For the ToMI-2 early, basic, and
advanced subscale scores, A6 consistently showed a poorer performance than N15 with
scores of 16.9, 19.2, and 16.4, respectively compared to N15’s scores of 20, 19.6, and
18.6. Item specific ToMI-2 scores for surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion,
showed a greater score for A5 than N15 for surprise, a lesser score for embarrassment,
and no difference for desire-based emotion.
In the post-intervention assessment, A6 showed no change in his ToMTB and
ToMI-2 scores. N15 showed no change in his ToMTB score but showed a clinically
significant decrease in his ToMI-2 score with a score of 16.4. N15 also showed a
clinically significant decrease in the early and advanced subscales with scores of 16.4 and
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14.3, respectively. When looking at the item specific scores for surprise, embarrassment,
and desire-based emotion, A6 showed a clinically significant decrease for surprise and a
clinically significant increase for embarrassment. N15, on the other hand, showed a
clinically significant decrease for both embarrassment and desire-based emotion.
Table 6: ToM scores for N15 and A6 pre- and post-intervention
N15
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention

A6
Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

ToMTB Total

12

13

13

14

ToMI-2
Composite Mean

19.3

16.4

17.6

17.2

ToMI-2 Early
Subscale

20

16.4

16.9

17.1

ToMI-2 Basic
Subscale

19.6

18.5

19.2

18.7

ToMI-2
Advanced
Subscale

18.6

14.3

16.4

15.6

Table 7: Surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion scores for N15 and A6
N15
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

A6
Post-Intervention

ToMTB TQ 5
(desire-based
emotion)

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

ToMI-2 51
(surprise)

15

15.3

20

16.4

ToMI-2 52
(embarrassment)

17.8

11.6

8.4

16.5

ToMI-2 59
(desire-based
emotion)

20

15.3

20

20
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Dyad 4: N11 vs. A3
In the pre-intervention assessment, it was found that A3 performed more poorly
than N11 on both the ToMTB and the ToMI-2 with scores of 5 and 9.1, respectively
where N11 produced scores of 13 and 14.7. Both participants correctly responded to
ToMTB question 5, assessing desire-based emotion. For the ToMI-2 early, basic, and
advanced subscale scores, A3 consistently showed a poorer performance than N11 with
scores of 15, 8.5, and 6.3, respectively compared to N11’s scores of 16.2, 16.2, and 12.4.
Item specific ToMI-2 scores for surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion
showed scores lower for A3 than N11, which is consistent with the previously mentioned
results.
In the post-intervention assessment, A3 showed no change in his ToMTB and
ToMI-2 performance. N11, on the other hand, showed clinically significant
improvements on both the ToMTB and ToMI-2, with scores of 15 and 18.8, respectively.
The same was shown in the breakdown of the ToMI-2 scores on the early, basic, and
advanced subscales. When looking at the item specific scores for surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotion, A3 showed a clinically significant decrease
for surprise and a clinically significant increase for embarrassment. N11 showed a
clinically significant change for embarrassment with a score of 20.
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Table 8: ToM scores for N11 and A3 pre- and post-intervention
N11
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention

A3
Pre-Intervention

Post-Intervention

ToMTB Total

13

15

5

5

ToMI-2
Composite Mean

14.7

18.8

9.1

9.7

ToMI-2 Early
Subscale

16.2

19.2

15

14.8

ToMI-2 Basic
Subscale

16.2

19.7

8.5

9.4

ToMI-2
Advanced
Subscale

12.4

17.6

6.3

6.9

Table 9: Surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotion scores for N11 and A3
N11
Pre-Intervention Post-Intervention

Pre-Intervention

A3
Post-Intervention

ToMTB TQ 5
(desire-based
emotion)

Pass

Pass

Pass

Fail

ToMI-2 51
(surprise)

19.4

20

15

12.4

ToMI-2 52
(embarrassment)

14.9

20

9.9

12.4

ToMI-2 59
(desire-based
emotion)

19.4

19.9

14.8

14.9

Discussion
As stated in the methods, the neurotypical and autistic participants were paired by
gender and age. Age was considered compatible if the participants were within one year
of each other. All participants had nonverbal intelligence and language within normal
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limits, with the exception of one student, A3, who scored lower than pre-specified criteria
for the language assessment.
With the exception of one pair, A6 and N15, the children with ASD performed
more poorly than neurotypical children on all measures of pre- and post- intervention.
Overall, children with ASD develop their ToM at a slower rate than neurotypical
children, which is well documented in the literature (Shumway & Wetherby, 2009;
Hutchins & Prelock, 2016). With the exception of N15 (who scored lower), the
neurotypical children maintained consistent ToM scores across the age groups with the
children all scoring within the same score ranges. In contrast, children with ASD (with
the exception of A3 who scored lower), increased their ToM scores with age. Based on
these findings, it seems that neurotypical children have achieved a level of ToM
competence in their development, while the ToM of ASD children lags behind, which has
been reported previously (Hutchins & Prelock, 2016a,b; Lerner at al., 2011). Clinically
significant improvements in ToM scores varied independent of age. Changes in
understanding those emotions specifically targeted in the intervention (i.e., surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotions) showed similar variability to overall ToM
understanding.
With the exceptions of A5 and N11 who showed significant improvements in the
basic and advanced subscales of ToMI-2 and N15 who showed a significant decrease in
those same subscales, no clinically significant changes were observed in the ToMI-2
subscales of the participants. One explanation for the significant decrease in N15 scores
may be that the parent became more aware of their child’s ability to understand and
respond to particular emotions since the initial pre-assessment. It may also be that the
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parent believed that in current interactions with the child, he generally understood
surprise, embarrassment, and desire-based emotions. As the parent was asked to think
about these particular emotions and participate in the development and implementation of
the social stories highlighting how one might respond to situations of surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotions, the difficulties her son experienced became
clearer, leading to lower ratings on the ToMI-2.
Limitations
A limitation of this study is the small sample size. Autism studies generally
consist of smaller sample sizes, but this study is further constrained by the rigid
parameters for participant selection which requires an ASD participant to be paired with a
NT participant of the same gender that is within twelve months of their age. As a result,
only five pairs were possible to be drawn from participants in the larger study. Further,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, intervention schedules were delayed, and some
participants withdrew from the study, reducing viable dyads to compare to four. The
small population size reduces the generalizability of the study and the criteria for
participant selection introduces selection bias. Additionally, these results have the
greatest application to males versus females as only one female pair could be made. This,
however, is not surprising as studies involving participants with ASD generally have a
lower proportion of female participants, likely due to the severely reduced number of
female individuals being diagnosed with autism (Ratto et al., 2018). Future studies should
consider not only a larger sample size but a broader age range and greater number of
female paired dyads.
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Conclusions and Implications
The findings of this study suggest that Theory of Mind understanding in
neurotypical individuals stabilizes during childhood, while that of ASD individuals
continues to develop. When examining within participant data, A1 showed clinically
significant improvement on the ToMTB and A5 showed clinically significant
improvement on the ToMI-2 Composite Mean, but the remaining two ASD participants
did not show clinically significant improvements on the ToMTB or ToMI-2 Composite
Mean, although some improvements were shown in individual subscales. Variability in
performance following intervention is a frequent occurrence in studies with children with
ASD (e.g., Hutchins & Prelock, 2012a,b). In the specific items for surprise,
embarrassment, and desire-based emotions, few clinically significant improvements were
shown. This may suggest that some of the more advanced ToM emotions fail to develop
in children with ASD. It may also suggest that the social story intervention structure does
not facilitate Theory of Mind understanding in some children diagnosed with ASD.
Future research might reconsider the social story format such as using animated films as
they could provide a better representation of social interaction and contextual cues in
social situations. Further research might also consider what characteristics of children
with ASD might most benefit from SS intervention as at least two of the four participants
with ASD in this study did show clinically significant change. Additionally, it may be
that certain aspects of ToM understanding are not responsive to a SS approach even
though the stories were personalized to represent the children’s specific experiences.
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APPENDIX A
N15 Social Story – Surprise
Emotion

Social Story
My name is Jackson. I love to play football.
Sometimes, when I am playing football, I see
one of my teammates is running slower than
the other teammates. Sometimes I make a
comment like, “You aren’t the fastest runner.”
I am thinking, “This is a fact and shouldn’t
hurt people’s feelings because it is the truth.”
If someone made the same comment to me, I
would think, “Oh, they are just telling me the
facts.”
My teammate was surprised by my comment.
He was probably thinking: “I know I ran slow
this time, but I am surprised that Jackson
noticed and said something to me.”

Surprise

My comment was an unexpected surprise that
made my teammate feel sad. He was probably
thinking: “I don’t want Jackson to think I am
slow.”
Comments I make don’t always make people
feel bad. Some comments make people feel
surprised and happy at the same time. My
teammates feel surprised and happy when I
pay attention to their efforts and say: “I notice
that you are running much faster than before. I
am so proud of you.”
My teammate will also feel happy when I
recognize his success. When he scores a point,
I can say: “Nice job! I knew you could do it.”
I will try to remember to surprise my
teammates, my friends and my family with
comments that make them feel happy.
It makes my teammates, friends and family
happy when I can offer unexpected surprise
comments that make them feel good.
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APPENDIX B
N15 Social Story - Embarrassment
Emotion

Social Story
My name is Jackson. I am 12 years old.
I love to play baseball.
During my baseball games, my teammates really
want to do well.
Sometimes my teammates get upset and cry when
they strike out.
I am thinking, “I don’t understand why my
teammates are so upset. I don’t cry if I strike out. I
know I can try to do better next time.”
I am learning that people can feel differently about
the same event.
Although I don’t like to strike out, I understand
that you can’t always hit the ball. I will try to
understand, however, that my teammates might
feel embarrassed if they strike out.

Embarrassment

My teammates might be thinking, “I can’t believe
I struck out—just when my team needed me. I am
so embarrassed.”
Sometimes, the faces of my teammates turn red
when they strike out. They must be thinking, “I
wish nobody could see me right now. I wish I
could disappear from this situation.”
When my teammates feel embarrassed and
uncomfortable, I can try to encourage them. I
could say, “I am proud of you no matter if we win
or lose.”
I can also cheer my teammates on by giving them
a high five.
My teammates are happy when I help them to feel
better and not feel embarrassed. They are probably
thinking: “Thank you Jackson! I was feeling
uncomfortable and so embarrassed. You helped us
feel better.”
I will try to remember to help people feel better
when they are feeling embarrassed.
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APPENDIX C
N15 Social Story – Desire-Based Emotions
Emotion

Social Story
I am Jackson. I play on a football team. My team
plays many games with other teams.
Everybody wants their team to win. When our
school team wins, we cheer with each other. We
feel so happy. Yet, sometimes, my team loses.
My teammates come off the field crying.
They are thinking: “We really wanted our team
to win. When we don’t win, it is very upsetting.”
I am confused about why some of my teammates
are crying because I don’t cry when we lose.
Sometimes people feel disappointed when they
cannot get what they want. They might respond
with disappointment, sadness or anger. Others
are good at dealing with disappointment. Just
like me, they can quickly shake off
disappointment.

Desire-Based Emotions

I try to calm myself down by taking some deep
breaths or thinking about a time when I got what
I wanted and how happy it made me feel.
When I am disappointed about something, I
remind myself, “Jackson, there is always next
time.”
I will try to remember that different people
respond differently when they cannot get what
they want.
I can help my teammates to calm down by
telling them to take a deep breath. I might say,
“Sometimes we cannot get what we want, and
that’s ok. We can try to do better next time.”
My mom feels happy when I understand that my
teammates might get upset when they cannot get
what they want. She is also happy to see me help
my teammates feel better when they are feeling
disappointed.
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APPENDIX D
A1 Social Story – Surprise
Emotion

Social Story
My name is AJ.
I am 9 years old.
I like surprises.
I like it when my grandma bakes for me.
One time, my grandma baked a cake for
my birthday.
When I came to her house, she said
“Surprise, I made a cake for your
birthday.”
I was so surprised and excited.

Surprise

One time, a robotic Lego master came to
school and that really surprised me.
Sometimes, I like to surprise my mom.
For Mother’s Day one year, I gave her a
glass blue bird.
She was not expecting me to get her a gift,
so she was surprised.
My mom was happy that I was thinking of
her on her birthday.
When I asked, “Is that the best gift I gave
you?”, she said, “Yes!”
My mom is happy when I surprise her.
My mom is happy when I understand how
she feels about surprises.
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APPENDIX E
A1 Social Story - Embarrassment
Emotion

Social Story
My name is AJ.
Sometimes I say things that embarrass other people.
One time in the store I said, “She’s got a big belly” and
another time I said, “She’s got a big butt” when I saw
someone who looked fat.
I didn’t think, “I wonder how that might make the
person feel.”
Saying a person has a “big belly” or a “big butt” is
embarrassing for the person and can make them feel sad.
I will try to remember not say things that might
embarrass or hurt another person’s feelings.
Usually, I don’t feel embarrassed when other people
might be embarrassed.
One time in 3rd grade, all the students in my class had to
rap a line of a song.

Embarrassment

Some of my peers were afraid and too embarrassed to
sing in front of people, but I wasn’t. I was thinking, “It
is fun to sing!” So, I took the microphone and rapped
my line. I didn’t think about how other kids might feel
embarrassed to sing in front of people.
Sometimes I don’t like to have my clothes on, so I walk
around the house in my underwear when people are
around. That makes other people uncomfortable. They
might think, “I wonder why AJ doesn’t have his clothes
on?” They might feel embarrassed. Usually, I don’t feel
embarrassed when I do things that might make other
people feel uncomfortable or embarrassed.
I will try to remember that everyone is not as
comfortable as I am when I say things that could hurt
their feelings or when I walk around in my underwear.
I will try to remember to ask my mom or dad before I
say or do something that might make other people feel
embarrassed. I might say to them, “Can I say this?” or
“Do you think this will make the person feel
uncomfortable or embarrassed?” I can also ask my
parents, “What should I say instead?” or “What should I
do so people won’t feel embarrassed?”
My mom and dad are proud of me when I think about
other people’s feelings.
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APPENDIX F
A1 Social Story – Desire-Based Emotions
Emotion

Social Story
My name is AJ.
I am 9 years old.
I have a friend named Connor.
One time, Connor got sick and we could not do
what we were supposed to on a weekend.
I was upset, but I used my words and asked,
Could we do it the next weekend?
Sometimes I remember to be calm and use my
words, and other times I get very upset when I
do not get to do what I want.
Sometimes when I don’t get to do what I want I
will cry and say, “It is not fair! Why can’t we do
it?” My mom and dad are thinking, “We
understand that AJ is upset and disappointed that
he did not get what he wanted, but nobody
usually gets what they want all the time.”

Desire-Based Emotions

I also don’t like to lose at games and that’s okay.
When I play the knock-out game, I do not like it
if I get knocked out. I am thinking, “Why did I
get knocked out? I am really upset because I
don’t want to lose the game.”
My family might be thinking, “We know AJ
likes to win, but he can’t always win, and we
don’t like to see him so upset.”
I will try to remember to stay calm, take a deep
breath, and use my words to tell my mom and
dad how I feel. My mom and dad can help me
remember by saying, “We see that you are
upset. You can take a deep breath and use your
words to tell us how you feel.”
It makes my mom and dad happy when I can tell
them how I feel and when I can stay calm and
take deep breaths when I don’t get what I want.
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